From Crusades to Colonization: Violence in Secular and Religious Political Theory

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Abstract: This paper examines the transition in political philosophy between the medieval and early-modern periods by focusing on the emergence of sovereignty doctrine. Scholars such as Charles Taylor and John Rawls have focused on the ability of modern states to overcome conflicts between different religious confessionals. In contrast, this paper seeks to examine some of the peace-promoting features of Latin-Christendom and some of the conflict-promoting features of modern-secular states. The Christian universalism of the medieval period is contrasted with the colonial ventures promoted by the Peace of Westphalia. This paper’s goal is not to argue that secularism is in fact more violent than religion. Rather, it seeks to demonstrate the major role that religion played in early modern philosophy and the development of sovereignty doctrine. It argues against the view that the modern, secular state is capable of neutrality vis-à-vis religion, and also combats the view that the secular nature of modern international law means that it is neutral to the different beliefs and values of the world’s peoples. These observations emphasize the ways in which state power and legitimacy are at the heart of the secular turn in political philosophy.

Keywords: Peace of Westphalia; secularism; early-modern; political philosophy; natural law.

The focus of this paper is a transition in political philosophy, from what I am calling the “religious” political philosophy of the medieval period to the “secular” philosophy of the early-modern period. Religion has struck many political philosophers as a particularly troublesome source of violence, and secularism has long been thought to hold the secret to ending such violence. From this perspective, secularism acts as a restraint on religion to ensure that its private practice does not get out of hand. Political philosophers such as Charles Taylor and John Rawls look back to the seventeenth century wars of religion as the paradigmatic example of religious conflict, and, furthermore, see the regime of international law that is traced back to the Treaty of Westphalia as the secular solution to such conflicts. However, a more thorough look at the way secular political institutions and secular political principles functioned during the early modern period does away with this neat picture. This article thus examines the role of political philosophy in the development of the secular concepts of the modern state and national consciousness during the early-modern period. Political secularism arises as the result of

the state’s appropriation of Church power, by placing ultimate authority in the hands of the sovereign people. I argue that rather than acting as a neutral arbiter between different religious confessionals, sovereignty doctrine actually advocated the subsumption of religious functions under the authority of the state to create new national forms of governance. Further, if we examine sovereignty doctrine and its effects on non-European peoples, we will see that the Treaty of Westphalia established an order that served to promote colonialism against non-European peoples at the same time as it promoted non-interference between European states.

Theoretical Approach

William T. Cavanaugh calls the belief that religion causes violence “one of the most prevalent myths in Western culture.” He cites nine leading scholars on religion who support this myth, and argues that it has three components: religion is absolutist, it is divisive, it is irrational. Cavanaugh believes that the motivations for separating religious from secular phenomena serve an ideological purpose, creating “a reassuring dichotomy between their violence – which is absolutist, divisive, and irrational – and our violence, which is modest, unitive, and rational.” While I agree with Cavanaugh that religion is no more prone to violence than secularism, I will show that the way medieval philosophy ordered violence and the way that modern, secular states order violence are distinct.

Similar to Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age, I contextualize the changes that took place in political theory between Latin-Christendom and our secular age in order to show how involved religious ideas were in the origins of secular thought. Rather than being a repudiation of religion, Taylor shows that secularism involves and participates in religion. Taylor explains the transitional role between Latin Christendom’s social imaginary and that of modern secularity through the development of natural law philosophy, focusing primarily on existential changes. Following Taylor, I argue that natural law provided a transitional set of beliefs that allowed political philosophers to move from justifying political authority on religious grounds to

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2. By “Church power,” I mean the wealth, authority, and prescribed legal powers of the fourteenth century Catholic Church. For a discussion of the various meanings of the term “secularization,” see José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). As Casanova here notes, “it has become customary to designate as secularization the appropriation, whether forcible or by default, by secular institutions of functions that traditionally had been in the hands of ecclesiastical institutions” (13). I am using the term “political secularism” in the sense of this functional appropriation, with a focus on the subordination of religious authority to state authority.


4. Cavanaugh, The Myth, 17. Cavanaugh does praise the research and insights of some of these scholars (e.g., Juergensmeyer), and also notes that there is some nuance in the connections each of these scholars make between religion and violence.


6. See Taylor, A Secular Age. In writing A Secular Age, Taylor was primarily concerned with explaining how, existentially, people’s perception of the world went through a process of “disenchantment.” For the distinction between existential and political secularization, see Ingrid Creppell, “Secularization: Religion and the Roots of Innovation in the Political Sphere,” in Religion and the Political Imagination, ed. Ira Katznelson and Gareth Stedman Jones (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 23–45.
justifying it on natural grounds. Unlike Taylor, I want to focus less on the existential shift that took place in people’s beliefs and more on the types of violence that each regime justified.

While Taylor focuses on Weber’s notion of “disenchantment” – whereby exclusive humanism came to replace a world populated by spirits and demons – I am interested in Weber’s claim that: “It is absolutely essential for every political association to appeal to the naked violence of coercive means in the face of outsiders as well as in the face of internal enemies... The state is an association that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence, and cannot be defined in any other manner.”\(^7\) The transcendent purpose of God, which subordinated the ruler to an otherworldly set of moral principles, is replaced by the worldly purpose of the state – the maintenance of political security through state violence. The present approach thus examines secular phenomena at the level of the social system (i.e., the state), as opposed to the psychological level of the individual, which is Taylor’s primary concern. While Taylor’s work is important for establishing the series of micro-transitions that were necessary to create the existential conditions of modern secularity, it glosses over the violent character of these transitions as expressed in Europe’s nationalist wars of unification and colonial wars of expansion.

This paper focuses on the changes taking place in political philosophy in the early-modern period. I take the development of the modern state to be a key sociological feature in this transition, and the sovereignty doctrine to be the key philosophical contribution to changes in political theory. My account contrasts some of the ways that religions can promote peace and some of the ways that secular states promote violence. I believe seeing the secular state as every bit as contingent and premised on absolutism as religious communities will help us to more fairly approach issues of religious and cultural difference. While “secular political theory” might be of an entirely different type than “religious political theory,” it would be premature to think that it is more peaceful. While it may prevent certain types of violence, it promotes other forms that are written off because they are understood as being natural and necessary to political life. This makes secular forms of violence invisible while justifying a lack of interest in the motivations behind “irrational,” religious violence. Thus, when philosophers like Brian Leiter ask: “Why tolerate religion?”, we might respond, “Why tolerate the state?”\(^8\)

I begin by outlining some features of medieval political philosophy that promoted peace, as well as the ways in which violence was directed. I then look at the works of Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes, to show how their revaluation of desire and power enabled the subordination of religion by the state in political theory. Sovereignty doctrine saw the world as a fundamentally frightening and violent place that only a sovereign could bring order to.

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Thereafter, the state began to appropriate many of the functions previously fulfilled by the Church, albeit in a modified form. I then examine Hugo Grotius and Francisco de Vitoria’s contributions to modern international law to demonstrate how the modern normative order, which, while promoting peace in Europe, simultaneously promoted violence and colonialism abroad. This is not only important because it exposes some of the bias in our institutions, but also because the history of that arbitrary bias has created a grossly unfair international political regime. As Talal Asad notes: “The difficulty with secularism as a doctrine of war and peace in the world is not that it is European (and therefore alien to the non-West) but that it is closely connected with the rise of a system of capitalist nation-states – mutually suspicious and grossly unequal in power and prosperity, each possessing a collective personality that is differently mediated and therefore differently guaranteed and threatened.”

The City of God and the City of Man

Medieval life relied on a variety of governing structures that enmeshed both Church officials and local lords in everyday politics. Despite the obvious overlap between secular and ecclesiastical politics, political philosophy in the Middle Ages maintained their theoretical bifurcation. Augustine’s *City of God* laid the groundwork for their separation in the fourth century, with a model that viewed the Church as the representative of the heavenly city, and secular rulers as a necessary evil brought about by man’s fall from the grace of God. Augustine thus rejects the moral authority of the philosophers on the basis that they lack the authority of God, and blames the licentious behaviour of the Roman gods for the concupiscence of the people. He contrasts faith with wisdom and frames the former as much more capable of inspiring virtue. He further contrasts the disorders of the secular realm with the eternal felicity of the city of God, as well as the divisions of the earthly realm with the unity of the Catholic faith – exemplified by the unity achieved with Christ through the Eucharist. Despite the subordination of the earthly ruler to the divine order, Augustine grants secular rulers the authority to enact punishments and even to wage war – so long as they wage it “in obedience to the divine command.”

Social life in Latin Christendom was organized primarily around the family and the Church. Family relationships were meant to regulate “the City of Man,” through a combination of Roman and customary law. The obligations of social life were distributed interpersonally through oaths of fealty and family alliances, while the Church served as a universal guarantor of these obligations. These ties did not all fit one mould (the term “feudalism” only originates in the

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11. “But the earthly city, which shall not be everlasting…has its good in this world, and rejoices in it with such joy as such things can afford. But as this is not a good which can discharge its devotees of all distresses, this city is often divided against itself by litigations, wars, quarrels, and such victories as are either life-destroying or short-lived” (Augustine, *City of God*, XV. 4).
eighteenth century), but they were notably more localized and personal than modern ties.\textsuperscript{13} The universalism of Catholicism was useful to the earthly rulers because it provided a dependable status quo to a Europe that was fraught with political instability.\textsuperscript{14} The Church extended family ties, guaranteed agreements, provided divine laws to limit the exercise of political authority, and provided a transcendent purpose to life. The conversions of the Hungarians and the Vikings extended Christianity steadily to the North and East, increasing the number of settled kings and lords who had more to gain from the surplus extracted from their vassal subjects than raids against their neighbors.\textsuperscript{15} The Church provided a “universal” community capable of absorbing non-members, a common language to communicate across vast distances, as well as a common cultural background that spread feudal ties of dependence. This moral and intellectual community provided a cultural unity where political unity proved impossible due to the power vacuum left by the Roman Empire.

As much as Christianity aimed to establish a universal community, it also excluded certain groups. The power of Christian universalism lay in the fact that it was willing to include anyone that accepted Christ’s miraculous resurrection. The spread of Christianity managed to overcome ethnic, tribal, and linguistic differences across a wider swath of territory than even the Roman Empire. Yet, while the Viking and Hungarian threat was resolved through their integration into Latin Christendom, Islam resisted conversion so that religious (as well as secular) factors encouraged violence between the opposing faiths. Put differently, although the universal character of Christianity is what made it so successful in pacifying the Hungarians and Vikings, it also set the stage for terrible conflicts with Islam. The Crusades are often referenced as a particularly virulent example of the type of violence that religion can give rise to, and they are still remembered as a particularly destructive chapter in the history of Christian and Muslim exchanges. However, we must also recognize the effect a transcendent purpose to life had on the direction this violence took: instead of conflicts between petty lords – which were discouraged by the Church (as a tendency, rather than a rule) – the Crusades represent a religious conflict sanctioned by the very institution that was meant to establish universal and eternal peace. This is not meant to condone the Crusades, but to note that the peace that was internally promoted by Latin-Christendom meant that some violence was directed outward as a result. In other words, while the peace-promoting facets of Latin Christendom framed as unjust the waging of war against a fellow Christian ruler, these same facets may be credited with the outward direction of violence manifested in the Crusades.

\textsuperscript{15} See Bloch, \textit{Feudal Society}. Bloch describes medieval Europe as being a system of ties of dependence that came about due to the political and cultural disorders from the invasions of the Scandinavians in the North, the Hungarians in the East, and the Muslims in the South. The invasions from the North and East were dealt with through a combination of military opposition, the granting of fiefs, and religious conversion.
If the outward violence of Latin Christendom is best exemplified by the Crusades, its internal violence is most apparent in the Inquisition. Christianity, once aided by the fact that it was separated from political identities and any conflict with local law, now began to turn in on itself, seeking a greater alignment between law, community, and belief. The universalism that enabled its expansion also made exclusion from the community that much more terrible. Excommunication was often a death sentence in a world that relied on interpersonal obligations. Furthermore, just as the First Crusade’s success had confirmed many in the belief that it had been authorized by God, so the loss of Jerusalem in 1187 was a prelude to the inward direction of religious violence. Observing this, Jonathan Riley-Smith hypothesizes that “holy war, whatever the religion involved, has the tendency to turn in on the society that has bred it.”

Beginning with the Cathar heresy in 1207, inquisitions were prosecuted with an aim to achieve greater orthodoxy and maintain the authority of the Pope over the Church faithful. Like the Crusades, this violence was meant to unify the faithful by rooting out heretics and schismatics. This tendency towards homogenization—which increased over time—would later become a hallmark feature of modernization. Secular, as well as ecclesiastical authorities, used the inquisition to suit political goals as much as to maintain orthodoxy.

While Augustine’s work was meant to provide a transcendent end to human life that contrasted sharply with the “City of Man,” Aquinas—drawing on Aristotle—saw the state as a body that was entirely natural. Thomism saw the secular government, while still subservient to God’s will, as partially redeemed, since it was based on a natural law established by God for the good of humanity. Aquinas’s interpretation of natural law created a link between God’s eternal law and the particular laws that “man” developed. Rather than being a profane necessity resulting from the fall, Aquinas saw the state as a natural part of God’s divine order.

Aquinas’s natural law theory remains thoroughly medieval in a number of ways. First, divine law (and therefore the authority of the Church) maintained its supremacy over human law. Furthermore, spirit is still opposed to the flesh for Aquinas. Desire, or “concupiscence,” is the cause of original sin and the deviation of Adam from God’s justice. Bad laws are those that impose unequal burdens and are the result of “cupidity or vainglory” on the part of the sovereign. Unlike what we see in Machiavelli or Hobbes, here vices are the cause of political strife and only faith and the rational subordination of the passions to the will are capable of correcting them. Most people are virtuous and the coercive power of the law therefore does not apply to them—it applies only to those corrupted by their vices. Finally, “just wars” are still permitted, but schism is not, as the unity of God’s natural and divine law are part of its very

18. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Father’s of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Bros, 1947), II.96.4, http://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa. Aquinas maintained (following Augustine) that an unjust law seems to be no law at all. However, he notes that it still ought to be followed to avoid scandal or disturbance—with the sole exception of laws that violate divine law, which justify rebellion against the sovereign.
19. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II.82.3.
20. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II.96.4.
While human law might diverge because of local circumstance, there can only be one interpretation of divine law. 

**Love, Fear, and the Centralization of the State**

Immanuel Wallerstein notes that the sociological phenomenon of the modern nation-state emerged prior to its recognition. He describes the development of nation-states in Western Europe as being the result of a crisis of feudalism, new developments in military technology, and territorial expansion. A climate induced contraction of the food supply led to increasing peasant rebellions and general instability. Changes in technology privileged centralized, large-scale armed forces and expanded state bureaucracies. Wallerstein describes the four main mechanisms used by princes in the sixteenth century for the development of the state as: “bureaucratization, monopolization of force, creation of legitimacy, and homogenization of the subject population.”

In short, there developed a new way of imagining community, premised neither on the family (which was too narrow), nor the Church (which was too broad). Since consent in every matter was nearly impossible to achieve – remember this was a period of time with constantly shifting interests – this unity had to be backed up with state force, and the state found the power to maintain its unity in three places: religion, state machinery, and national consciousness.

Spain, France and England were among the first states in Europe to achieve centralized unification, but the first to theorize about such unification was Niccolo Machiavelli in divided Italy. Scholars are split on the proper interpretation of Machiavelli’s views on religion. Leo Strauss sees Machiavelli as a “teacher of evil,” who ignored the crucial question of the veracity of revealed religion, and collapsed the classical difference between a prince and a tyrant. Following Strauss, Vickie B. Sullivan argues that Machiavelli’s view is essentially anti-Christian, drawing on the lessons of republican Rome to develop a vision of Italy free from Christian domination. On the other hand, Maurizio Viroli sees Machiavelli’s prince as an “armed prophet” who attempts the difficult task of organizing new political institutions with an understanding of God based heavily on the views of the Florentine Renaissance at the time. Both interpretations agree, however, that religion in Machiavelli’s thought is meant to be under the control of state authorities – in other words, the alignment between religion and the state is

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22. Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, III.39.3. Note that this is in marked contrast to the Hobbesian, positive law tradition which held the inverse view – that people might believe many different things but that there could only be one sovereign law in any given territory.
meant to achieve intellectual and moral unity for the sake of founding a powerful new state. In this sense, rather than modern-secularism being premised on the separation between Church and state, it is in fact better understood as the appropriation of Church functions by the state.

Machiavelli’s thought represents a major pivot point in philosophy that turns the transcendent moral authority of medieval political thought to practical political ends. Unlike Aquinas, Machiavelli does not see a beneficent order in nature, but rather an ocean of obstacles and opportunities upon which we can virtuously act. His materialist politics does not do away with religion, instead it directs religion to the task of state formation. Machiavelli begins with Polybius’s classical theory of a cycle of governments, where each of the good types of government passes into its pernicious form, and a state capable of withstanding these changes in fortune is imagined. Machiavelli believed that it was primarily inheritance – whereby the prince’s successors are chosen for their lineage rather than their ability – which leads all governments towards corruption. While medieval political philosophy sought to teach virtue and religion as a means of forestalling corruption, Machiavelli imagines a prince who uses his power to found a new type of state – one capable of overcoming the vicissitudes of fortune.

The state is created by the prince ex nihilo, taking the place of God in the natural order. Machiavelli describes nature (fortuna) as something that the prince can stand outside of and affect through an act of will (virtu). The prince stands outside the order of nature, observing the laws according to which it works with a practical political project in mind: the formation of a unified Italian state. In the words of Waller R. Newell: “recognizing Fortuna, we recognize that nature does not support classical or Christian virtue and offers no prospect for peace and decency. This awful truth, however, liberates us to face the world without delusion and bend it to our will, making it as productive and liveable as we can. This requires a politics in which acquisitiveness is liberated and served by the new art of government.”

Machiavelli’s revaluation of the role of desire allows his prince to dispense with justice when justice is not in the best interests of the state. The chief virtue of princes now lies in founding kingdoms rather than in following divine justice. The earthly interests of princes replace the divine will of God. It is this contrast that will later allow secularization theorists, such as Weber, to contrast the worldliness of the state and economy to the “world-rejecting” logic of religion.

Machiavelli saw the bifurcation of the religious and secular powers of society as a threat to Italian security, and it is for this reason that religion plays such a prominent role in his thinking. He believed that “it is the Church that has kept, and keeps, Italy divided.” This was because Rome lacked sufficient temporal power to take control of Italy itself and abused its

30. See Waller R. Newell, “Is there an Ontology to Tyranny?” in Confronting Tyranny: Ancient Lessons for Global Politics, ed. Toivo Koivukoski and David Edward Tabachnick (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 141–159. While I disagree with the strong association Newell draws between Machiavelli and modern totalitarianism, I agree that Machiavelli is a key figure in the transition to modern political thought – which makes modern totalitarianism possible.
authority to prevent any other state from rising in prominence. It therefore divided Italy by dividing the people’s loyalty. However, Machiavelli contrasts the Church with religion, which he believes to be entirely necessary for a state to prosper. He even goes so far as to say that there has never been a legislator who has attempted to introduce new laws to a people without “recourse to God.”

Despite the primary virtue of princes being the founding of kingdoms, Machiavelli says that even greater than founding a kingdom is founding a religion, through which that kingdom might be kept unified. Rather than the Catholic Church being the guardian of religion, he blames its corruption for the “irreligiousness” of Italy.

He further blames the then-current state of Christianity for the political problems of Italy, while praising the principles of Christianity – setting up a contrast between good and bad uses of religion. Just as the structure of the state (a single ruler) gave no indication as to the nature of the government (monarchy/tyranny), so the form of a religion (Christianity) gives no indication as to its religiousness (true/false religion). In the formation of a unified Italian state, the major obstacle will be the abuse of religion by Rome. This can be corrected by a good prince, provided that he appears religious.

What concerns Machiavelli about religion is not whether it is true, but rather what effect it provokes in the people. However, it cannot simply be used by the powerful to manipulate the people. The people will believe in religions that keep them united and prosperous but will become incredulous and cease to uphold state institutions if they discover they are being manipulated for the benefit of elites. We can therefore contrast “religion” (proper) which creates unity, with “corrupt religion” which creates disorder. Furthermore, Machiavelli believed it was necessary to interpret religion according to virtu rather than idleness, which the Church had neglected to do. The unity brought about by Christianity thus needed the martial virtu of the ancient Romans – a position that Machiavelli describes as the correct interpretation of religion. Religion is therefore the force that binds the prince’s troops to him and ensures that they keep their oaths, something that is lacking in mercenaries and the reason that he cautions the prince against them. The prince requires the genuine faith of the people, which is something money cannot buy. Religion, from this perspective, operates as a faith in one’s prince, by both the military and the people. The “appearance” of religious faith must be fostered, because there are always instances when a person’s private interest is in tension with their service to the community, and they need faith in a transcendent notion of their communal obligations to keep

34. Machiavelli, The Discourses, I.11.
35. Machiavelli, The Discourses, I.11. Machiavelli further states that “owing to the bad examples set by the court of Rome, Italy has lost all devotion and all religion. Attendant upon this are innumerable inconveniences and innumerable disorders; for as, where there is religion, it may be taken for granted that all is going well, so, where religion is wanting, one may take for granted the opposite” (The Discourses, I.12).
38. Machiavelli, The Discourses. “But when the oracles began to say what was pleasing to the powerful, and this deception was discovered by the people, they became incredulous and inclined to subvert any good institution” (The Discourses, I.12).
40. Machiavelli, The Prince, ch. XII.
them from abandoning the prince at such times.

All of this is to say, the formation of a national state involves the formation of a civic consciousness that binds the people to the state (in Machiavelli’s case – a prince) in a way that employs many of the same symbolic tools and devotional practices that were employed by the Church. “Nationalism” and “ideology” come to replace “religion” in the secular frame of mind, but the function that they serve in binding diverse peoples together in a common community takes on much the same role. It was through a “pious work of cruelty” that Ferdinand of Aragon established the modern state of Spain through the expulsion of the Moors. Machiavelli’s prince, despite the noble ends he seeks, is undeniably cruel when cruelty is in service to the state, but he must use the “cloak of religion” to accomplish such things. The religious fervour with which the state is supported is most evident in the “Exhortation to Liberate Italy from the Barbarians,” where Machiavelli implores Lorenzo de Medici to avail himself of this new form of power. God is mentioned more in this last chapter than in the rest of the work combined, and the people’s devotion to the prince hits its highest pitch. The religion Machiavelli hopes for is a religion for the Italian people, proclaimed by the prince. This religion must remain true, rather than allowing itself to become corrupted, by serving as a unifying symbol of the people and guaranteeing the faith they keep with one another and their prince. It should be apparent from this that the truth (in the metaphysical sense) of a religion is secondary to its political value. In this sense, religion has more in common with ideology than with scientific theories about the universe. While the nation does attempt to transcend differences – especially religious ones – its ambitions are limited to a particular people. If a new group of people are incorporated into a state (such as the Moors in Spain) – the prince is at constant risk of sedition and may need to resort to “acts of pious cruelty” to maintain control.

Scriptural Analogues to Sovereignty Doctrine

In this section I show that the internal theorization of the citizen-state relationship was premised even more firmly on a Christian religious imaginary than the open-ended version of state-religious formation advocated by Machiavelli. The modern state not only depends on religious fervor to create a monopoly over force, but the relationship between the citizen and the state was understood in particularly (Protestant) Christian terms in the modern natural law tradition.

Thomas Hobbes, like Machiavelli, re-examines the role of desire and power in political theory and radically reinterprets natural law theory. For Hobbes, rather than carrying a moral

41. Machiavelli, *The Prince*, ch. XXI. This has always struck me as one of the most terrifying passages in Machiavelli’s thought. The “pious work of cruelty” that he mentions is the forced conversion and expulsion of the Jewish and Muslim people living in Spain. Machiavelli seems to recognize here that the modern state (a state he advocated) was often predicated on genocidal campaigns meant to unify the population under the prince.

42. The notion of the sovereign people relies on the idea of a nation that is unified enough to have a “national interest.” Insofar as the sovereign power perceives outsiders (i.e., those not belonging to the nation) as a threat to the national interest, those outsiders are at risk of increased efforts at assimilation, oppression, expulsion, and genocide. See, for example, Hannah Arendt’s account of the precarious position of Jewish citizens in France following the revolution (*The Origins of Totalitarianism* [New York: Harcourt, 1968]).
message for rational beings to better align their lives, natural law demonstrates that human beings are motivated more by fear than by love. Like Machiavelli, his goal is to use the fear that human beings have and their desire to preserve themselves to escape the state of nature. Unlike Machiavelli, however, Hobbes is writing with unified, post-reformation England in mind, where the prince had already established his own Church. The ecclesiastical corruption that Machiavelli had observed split the Church and became the basis for conflict and sedition.

Hobbes sought to curb the “endless civil wars” that such divisions caused by maintaining the unitary nature of secular and spiritual power. He accomplished this not by dismissing ecclesiastical power, but by combining it with, and subordinating it to, sovereign power. Hobbes has been designated an atheist by many of his seventeenth century critics, as well as by contemporary proponents. Aloysius P. Martinich attacks this interpretation of Hobbes, wherein references to religion are understood to be tangential to his overall political project. Instead, Martinich argues, Hobbes “is trying to supply a theoretical justification for believing in Scripture, which he thinks is under subtle attack from both incipient modern science and self-appointed interpreters with disruptive political motives.” While Martinich believes that Hobbes was a key figure in the development of secularism, he believes that this was an unintended consequence of Hobbes’s work. In other words, like Newton and Descartes, Hobbes’s work ultimately served to undermine the religious institutions that he believed in. However, despite his failure to maintain the importance of religion in the face of new social and scientific developments, Hobbes’s legacy has been to develop a body of work which explains the motivations of modern humans so accurately that it could be described as a “Bible for modern man.” Hobbes maintains the relevance of scripture, while changing its interpretation to demonstrate modern principles of statecraft. In this sense, Hobbes’s secularism is not a repudiation of religion, but an honest attempt at its reform.

For Hobbes, good and evil are not transcendent states made known to humans through their use of natural reason; instead, they are relative states that pertain to the desires of individuals to pursue or avoid certain objects. Likewise, he understands power to be the means to obtain such private desires. In contrast to classical and medieval philosophy, Hobbes ascribes “a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death” to “all mankind.” Power itself, however, receives an incredibly democratic character in Hobbes’ revaluation, for it is divided into the physical power of the individual and the sovereign power of...
the people united. The sovereign commands obedience by virtue of his or her power, but that power is itself predicated on the obedience of others. The democratic nature of power does not mean that it is democratically executed. Rather, its unitary nature – and for Hobbes it must be unitary, or it ceases to function effectively and becomes a power divided – means that it is best executed by a singular will. This unification of the “Multitude” allows “the Generation of that great Leviathan, or rather (to speak more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which we owe under the Immortall God, our peace and defense.”\footnote{Hobbes, \textit{Leviathan}, 227.} Hobbes bases the absolute moral and political authority of the state on an analogy with a Judeo-Christian model of God. More importantly, the normative framework provided by religion becomes the very basis for the unitary personality of the state.

For Hobbes, religion remains an important governing institution for the state, but in the secularized form of a national character. As Martinich notes: “Hobbes…transformed religious concepts into secular concepts. For example, the biblical and medieval model of God’s method of creating the world becomes the model for creating the commonwealth.”\footnote{Martinich, \textit{Hobbes}, 10.} Again, secularism is not the same as religion and there are a number of developments that Hobbes makes that depart from what we moderns would call religion. What Hobbes does not abandon, however, are religious authority, religious doctrine, and religious identity. These facets of religion are incorporated under the aegis of the sovereign. Like Machiavelli, he develops a contrast between “true religion” and “superstition,” and understands his philosophical contribution to take place in terms of religious reform, rather than as an attack on religion.

The “Mortall God” of the state derives its authority from an oath by each individual to renounce their natural right and place it in the hands of the state. The basis of this oath is God, the only force that Hobbes believes capable of ending the war of all against all, for “there is no Swearing by any thing which the Swearer thinks not God.”\footnote{Hobbes, \textit{Leviathan}, 201.} The transcendent notion of God that stands above the “Mortall God” of the sovereign loses all specificity beyond calling the state into being. Put differently, faith in a transcendent God is needed to establish the state, but after its establishment all authority resides in the sovereign. The sovereign’s absolute authority is then capable of putting an end to the anarchic state of nature. Prudential interest is not sufficient to end the war of all against all. For that, we require faith in the covenant made by people when they “lay down [their] right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men as [they] would allow other men against [themselves].”\footnote{Hobbes, \textit{Leviathan}, 190. Emphasis mine.} Without faith, it would be a strange claim that we can be secure in the speech acts of others to renounce their right to all things. Why not maintain, as did Aquinas, that the state of nature obliges us to respect the lives and property of others? This is because, for Hobbes, while faith is necessary, it is not sufficient to establish an obligation. One must also be able to rely on social sanction. Faith alone is insufficient because we lack the sense of certainty that is enabled by power. However, power
alone is insufficient, since individuals are incapable of protecting themselves in the absence of a civil power – one that is premised on a certain amount of faith in the state.\footnote{One might object that I am conflating different meanings of the term “faith” here, and that there is a difference between faith as “trust in a person,” “belief in something that cannot be demonstrated,” and “membership in a particular religious community such as Christianity.” In spite of the lack of precision in which common speech employs the word, “faith” remains helpful in understanding religious phenomena. First, in the Christian tradition there is a strong connection between “trust in a person” and “belief in something that cannot be demonstrated.” Hobbes brings out the anxiety that people have over this lack of certainty in the state of nature. In order to trust one another we need to be able to demonstrate a deep and abiding commitment to a given normative order, which, according to Hobbes, does not exist in nature. In order to establish this normative order we need to place our own powers (physical, intellectual and moral) into the hands of the sovereign, who backs it up with force. In this sense, the word “faith” helpfully maintains the link between these different notions. Trust in the political institutions and in one’s compatriots is one of the hallmark features of modern stability.}

Hobbes also rejects the authority of the Catholic Church. He maintains that if the Church had authority over ecclesiastical matters across Christendom, they would have control over secular matters as well. This not being the case, the bishops and ministers of the Church must be subject to the sovereign power of each of the political societies in which they are located. When this is not the case, it means that sovereignty is divided and society is in a state of civil war “between the sword of justice, and the shield of faith.”\footnote{Hobbes, \textit{Leviathan}, 499.} Furthermore, beyond his abstract description of religion’s role in the state, Hobbes maintains that public worship must be uniform. Again, the religious oath that guarantees the unity of the sovereign power demands a public conformity to the official practice of religion. The strong identification of religion with national culture in seventeenth century Europe, combined with the subordination of the moral authority of the Church to the monarch, set the stage for the earliest nationalist conflicts.

From the preceding discussion, a number of things are evident. First, early-modern political theory made religion pivotally important in the construction of the state. The sovereign state appropriated moral, communal, financial, and institutional resources from the Catholic Church rather than doing away with them. Furthermore, natural law theory was understood as having the support of scripture and some of its features were derived from the authority of scripture. There was no sense of opposition between natural reason and scripture – religious rebellion against the sovereign was understood as stemming chiefly from people’s incredulity and their lack of understanding of the laws of nature. Finally, the Church maintained its transcendent moral authority, but became subordinate to the sovereign power of the state.

Sovereignty doctrine not only established the monarch as the supreme political authority, it also provided the basis for a secular international order based on agreements between states. The sovereign power, which was first established to end the anxiety felt in the state of nature, now exists in a world governed by other sovereign powers. The anxiety that existed between individuals in the state of nature was then transposed to an international level and becomes both the reason for agreements between states and reason to worry that such agreements can be broken at any time.
Sovereignty and International Law

Hugo Grotius and Francisco de Vitoria laid the foundation for modern international law by replacing the international religious authority of the pope with a system based on natural law. My goal in the following discussion is to highlight the reconfiguration of socially prescribed violence, from an order based on religious authority to one based on international law. I draw on scholarship by Antony Anghie to show how the rise of modern international law promoted Eurocentrism and imperialism abroad, even as it promoted peace at home. I will look at Grotius first, to demonstrate how secularism was meant to maintain order in a Europe that was normatively fractured. I will then turn to Vitoria, to show how this marked the transition from a religious world order to a European international order, rather than a genuinely pluralist one. This is important, because if international law is premised on principles that are arbitrary or self-serving, then it loses the “neutrality” that secular institutions espouse.

While political philosophy dealt primarily with the nature of sovereignty in a relatively abstract sense, international legal theorists were required to constantly relate their theories to the actual treaties that were signed between states. As with the concept of sovereignty, upon which international law was to be based, the purpose of international law was the promotion of peace. However, since the sovereign was the artificial personality of the people with powers that could not be divided without the destruction of sovereignty itself, there was no sovereign to maintain the oaths between states. This made signing treaties (the foundation of international law) an uncertain venture, as each state retained the sovereign prerogative to withdraw from such a treaty at any time.

While the idea of an international society was hardly new, Grotius is credited with developing the form that modern international society took – one premised on the concepts of natural law and sovereignty. Religious authority was hotly contested during this time, with kings, popes, and local ecclesiastical authorities all seeking to extend their moral sway over the faithful, as well as to capture the wealth that came along with such authority. Hobbes’ reinterpretation of natural law theory placed power over religious doctrine firmly in the control of the sovereign, but this failed to solve the problem of interstate conflicts over religion. As with Hobbes, natural law’s requirement that we abide by our agreements provided Grotius with the means to overcome the divisions between different confessionalists. However, a key difference that sets Grotius apart in the development of secularism, is that he maintains that this would “have a degree of validity even if we should concede that which cannot be conceded without the utmost wickedness: that there is no God, or that the affairs of men are of no concern to him.”

While Christianity continues to provide important lessons and backing for the sort of international community Grotius advocates, the source of the state’s power comes from the social nature of human beings, rather than from God as the guarantor of human fidelity. Grotius thereby

completes the transition from a natural law tradition that is couched firmly in a Christian universe, to one that is based on the social nature of human beings.\(^{57}\)

Grotius maintains that the *jus gentium* (law of nations) that exists between states derives its power from two places. First, he argues that those who wage war with justice on their side are awarded a psychological strength that many historians credit with being the deciding factor in victory. Second, other states are less likely to ally themselves with you if you constantly break your agreements and show no respect for the rule of law. Unlike Hobbes, Grotius maintains that international law can be effective without an international sovereign, since the norms and expectations that states have of one another mitigate the uncertainty that exists in the state of nature. Just as the national who breaks the law for private advantage undercuts their own future security by undermining the authority of the state, “so the state which transgresses the laws of nature and of nations…cuts away also the bulwarks which safeguard its own future peace.”\(^{58}\) Peace is effective insofar as the parties at peace believe they may be at a disadvantage in some future war. However, if a state has no fear whatsoever of future conflict (in their dealings with weaker societies not recognized by other sovereign powers), it has no reason to uphold its future promises. Despite the fact that Grotius maintains that the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor have no sovereign authority over the world, he does believe that Christians can legitimately form holy leagues to defend themselves. It is even their duty to do so.\(^{59}\) The common religion that Europeans have with one another becomes the basis of mutual respect and obligation between Christians, despite the denial that it is sufficient to establish the authority of the Pope or the Holy Roman Emperor. Key to the future development of secularism was Grotius’s contention that the authority of the Apostles extended primarily to “heavenly things,” and that they lacked authority “of an earthly quality.” He attributes this limit to the fact that they used words rather than swords. The sovereign’s authority over earthly things is attributed to military force rather than any notion of divine justice.

Despite the different confessionalists that warred against one another, intra-European agreement over different aspects of law became universalized to form the norms of international law, creating peace amongst the warring European powers. Converting foreign peoples to Christianity is no longer a just reason to wage war — so long as they hold some God or gods sacred and abide by their agreements.\(^{60}\) The new importance of religion is in the common civilization it makes out of European states, “since all Christians are members of one body.”\(^{61}\) Religion is delegitimized as a basis for conflict in the secular version of international law espoused by Grotius. However, a secularized version of religion is put forward in its place. Secular Christianity seeks to establish civilizational bonds between states whose religions resemble one another, despite being importantly different in respect to certain features of their


beliefs. Christianity loses the transcendent character and authority that it had in the natural law doctrine of Aquinas, instead becoming a civilizational group tasked with protecting a common history.

As with all theories of human nature, the one Grotius develops is heavily conditioned by the historical context in which he writes. He uses historical norms and similar judgements from across European history as the basis for international law. Although such norms had success in establishing peace within Europe through the treaty of Westphalia, they accomplished very little with respect to establishing peace between Europe and its exterior. Gradually, an ethnically and historically constructed notion of “Europe” emerges to eclipse the more religiously based social imaginary of “Latin-Christendom.” Religious traditions and norms based on Church and family thereby give way to secular traditions and norms based on nationality and an “international” (Eurocentric) order that exists between states.

Edward Keene notes two themes in Grotius’s work that enabled and promoted colonialism – the divisibility of sovereign power and the right of individuals to appropriate “unoccupied” lands. Unlike Hobbes, Grotius provides examples of divided sovereignty: when a sovereign’s subjects maintain their own rights over certain sovereign prerogatives, when colonies are established that leave the mother-country in a superior position, when states are forced to pay tribute to one another, and when states enter into unequal alliances that place one in permanent subordination to the other. The divisibility of sovereignty allowed European states to appropriate the sovereign powers of non-European peoples. Europeans would travel where they wished and then prosecute wars of conquest when they met with local hostility and resentment for their appropriation of resources.

Grotius continues in the line of Christian thinkers who argue in favor of a “just war” doctrine, maintaining that the history and traditions of the Catholic Church demonstrate the compatibility between Christian principles and war (despite noting some dissenting views). Since the power of the sovereign is based on their ability to wage war, and just war can only be waged in response to the violation of a right, establishing territorial and property rights becomes integral to the project of international law. In particular, the difference between sovereign right and private property is established. Grotius notes that “whoever has control over the lands and waters can by his order prohibit any person from taking wild animals, fish or birds, and thereby acquiring them.” This is curious, as Grotius himself acknowledges, because it seems to limit the liberty that exists in the state of nature. However, he maintains that municipal law can limit such liberties when they are the custom of the state. European property relations, which Grotius acknowledges are based solely in custom, are thereby foisted onto other cultures and the industrious management of resources becomes an acceptable reason to appropriate the sovereign powers of a people. It is important to point out that despite the “rationalism” in the Grotian system, it maintains certain arbitrary traditions as international norms on the sole basis that they

had been widely accepted within Europe. Furthermore, since the original implementation of those norms served as the justification to colonize and then appropriate vast quantities of resources, which further enriched the core states of the emerging international system, these norms have helped to impoverish colonized states and destroy indigenous structures of governance that might have served as sovereign institutions had their autonomy been recognized from the beginning.\footnote{For a discussion of Europe’s need to expand their territory and food supply to address the crisis of feudalism, see Wallerstein, \textit{Capitalist Agriculture}, 38.}

Francisco de Vitoria, who wrote a century before Grotius, was highly concerned with the plight of Native Americans under Spanish rule. The conquistadores had been given free-reign by the monarchs to extract as much wealth from the Americas as possible. Prior to Vitoria, the dominant understanding of international law gave the power to make decisions concerning the acquisition of lands outside of Latin Christendom to the Pope. Vitoria roundly rejects this as a valid means to determine law. He argues that the Pope is not the temporal lord of the world, but only head of the Church.\footnote{Francisco De Vitoria, \textit{Political Writings}, ed. Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 83–85.} Furthermore, Vitoria militates against the view that natives can be conquered on the grounds of lacking “reason” or “government.” Since the natives do in fact have rationality they are able to participate in the \textit{jus gentium}, and, moreover, as the natives also have government, their sovereigns are capable of representing them and executing their obligations to the \textit{jus gentium}.

Antony Anghie has criticized Vitoria for foisting Spanish standards of international conduct on the “Indian” as a means of justifying the continuation of the Spanish conquest.\footnote{Antony Anghie, \textit{Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).} His argument proceeds as follows: The \textit{jus gentium} gives certain universal rights to all nations, including the right to travel peaceably, the right to trade peaceably, and the right to proselytize (Christianity – other religions are not mentioned). Anghie notes that since any attempt to stop Spanish incursions into the Americas violates this universal right, the “Indians” are subject to conquest in a just war waged by the Spanish. Anghie looks at three moves by Vitoria that accomplish this. First, he posits the relationship between the Spanish and the “Indian” as one of difference. Second, he bridges the gap between these cultures through appeal to a \textit{jus gentium}, and third, he effaces “Indian” difference through their subsumption by Spain through conquest. International law did nothing to protect the territory of the indigenous peoples of the Americas. Despite the Papal Bull \textit{Sublimis Deus} (1537) – that declared the “Indians” rational (and therefore not subject to slavery) – and the New Laws of 1542, passed by Spain for the protection of the native peoples of the Americas, the lust for bullion and slave labour demanded by the increasingly powerful and centralized states of Europe meant that the zeal of the conquistadores was allowed to proceed unchecked. Thus, while Vitoria’s intentions may have been to get Spain to recognize “Indian” sovereignty – and, accordingly, their responsibility to enter into peaceable relations with them – his theory was used by states to make sovereignty doctrine the basis on
which indigenous land was appropriated by the colonial powers. The rights given to the “Indian” by the Spanish crown served more to subordinate Spain’s new vassal subjects than to protect them from the conquistadores.

International law remains one of the major developments of our secular age. This order has been of service in promoting international peace and cooperation in Europe, despite some spectacular failures. However, promoting peace between the sovereign powers in Europe by fostering a common normative order promoted colonialism and domination abroad. Secular traditions, like religious ones, are liable to corruption when they entrench the power of some and deny the rights of others. As I noted when discussing the ways in which Latin-Christendom promoted peace (and war), international law also structures violence in ways that simultaneously promote certain types of peace (e.g., between France and the Netherlands) while justifying some forms of violence (e.g., the colonization of the Americas). The naturalness of colonization runs deep, even in societies that have attempted to come to grips with it.

The Westphalian Consensus and the Modern State

Violence was reorganized in a number of ways following the Treaty of Westphalia. First, there was no super-sovereign power to settle disputes. Since the European wars of religion were, in part, fought over the power of the Pope relative to Christendom, the Pope was not in a position to negotiate an end to hostilities – this power was given to each individual state. The principle of cuius regio, eius religio aligned both the secular and religious powers of the state under the monarch. Religion still influenced foreign policy but was seen increasingly to be subject to the interests of states. Crusades were no longer called, but the importance of colonization increased. Colonization became the defining characteristic of the dominant European powers relative to the rest of the world. Societies that did not possess enough military power (relative to the newly emerging European states) were not considered sovereign and therefore had none of the rights of sovereignty.

The stakes of political atrocities also increased with the rise of the modern state. Technology, bureaucratization, and a monopoly of force mean that the modern state is able to persecute minorities and foreigners more effectively than ever before. Newell sees the rise of modern politics, beginning with Machiavelli and transmitted into liberalism through Hobbes, as radically altering the nature of tyranny. While classical tyranny proceeded from a tyrant’s unrestrained pursuit of pleasure, modern tyranny seeks “an impersonal, self-abnegating, and therefore seemingly ‘idealistic’ destruction of all premodern ties to family, class, and region in the name of a contentless vision of unified community or state.”

The millenarian content of Christianity is put into the service of humanity through the doctrine of revolution – wherein a better future (whether nationalist, liberal, communist, etc.) is promised to reform society and

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68 This is not to say that Europe was a peaceful place at the time. However, as with my argument about the peace promotion of the Catholic Church, the new secular order managed to stifle some of the major conflicts between European sovereign powers even as it gave rise to new forms of violence abroad.
69 Newell, “Is there an Ontology,” 141.
establish the City of Heaven on earth. For Newell, this creates the conditions for modern genocide, as the ideals of the revolution take precedence over the lives of the citizens.

Conclusion

This paper set out to note some of the differences and continuities between the medieval-religious political theories of philosophers such as Augustine and Aquinas, with the early-modern, secular political theories of philosophers such as Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Grotius. Both religions and sovereign states foster group cohesion and make claims on people’s loyalty, which set the stage for the violent conflicts of the seventeenth century. The lines between “religious” and “secular” violence were therefore blurred during this transition, as religious institutions struggled to maintain their position while secular institutions increasingly appropriated the old resources of the religious establishment. These blurred lines have also created the conditions for many contemporary conflicts between religious believers and the state, as religious authority has surged in a number of places even as the legitimacy of the secular state has come into question.

This transition is also significant for political philosophy, as many of the key metaphors used by early-modern philosophers were thoroughly religious. Machiavelli is often associated with the development of the nation-state, despite the fact that this is a term he never uses. Religion is the primary concept he uses to explain the psychological unity displayed in successful states, whereas “corrupt religion” is the metaphor he uses to explain the divisions that plagued Italy. Religion was not judged good or bad depending on its metaphysics, but rather on the use to which it was put. In a similar vein, Hobbes clearly likens the unitary nature of the state to the unitary nature of God. In doing so, he created a metaphor for the absolute power of the state, which liberalism has had great trouble shaking off. The mortal God of the state has developed formidable powers to maintain the rule of law and the security of its subjects—while also creating the conditions that allow the state to persecute political minorities and prosecute foreign wars more effectively.

Finally, the legacy of the Westphalian consensus has led to the development of doctrines that simultaneously maintain the historical legality of colonialism, while rejecting it as a principle of justice. Since all the nations of the world are part of a single international community, no country has the right to invade any other. Yet that community was not founded on universal principles, but was rather based on a European consensus. Since recognition was the basis for membership in the international community, and the original members of the jus gentium were all European (in practice, if not in theory), European states were able to parlay recognition into advantageous international agreements. The order in which states were recognized by the jus gentium continues to have very real effects on colonized peoples, and challenges to the international system are inevitable as long as people experience the established order as externally imposed and unjust. Insofar as communities perceive their religion as more representative of their collective identity than the state, religion will continue to challenge the authority of the state as the ultimate arbiter in social conflicts.
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