The “Uyghurs in the Diaspora in Canada” 2021 Survey Report¹

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Abstract: This report presents the results of “The Uyghurs in the Diaspora in Canada” survey. It was conducted between November 2020 and January 2021, by the research team affiliated with the project, Children in Sectarian Religions and State Control at the School of Religious Studies, McGill University.² Our aim was to gather information on the Uyghurs who left their Homeland (East Turkestan/Xinjiang) and relocated to Canada. The survey consists of 45 questions that focus on why and how these immigrants came to Canada and what challenges they faced in China. Our respondents numbered 106, and our findings indicate that they were subject to widespread discrimination and oppression in China before emigrating to Canada. Other questions explore their contact with relatives in their Homeland and their level of religiosity since arriving in Canada. Finally, we sought to understand how they are currently attempting to preserve their Uyghur culture and language while living in diaspora.

Keywords: Uyghur Homeland, Diaspora, Discrimination, Oppression

This report describes a survey of Uyghurs in Canada, conducted between November 2020 and January 2021, by the research team affiliated with the project, Children in Sectarian Religions and State Control at McGill University’s School of Religious Studies. This research is part of an Insight grant supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. The team is composed of Susan J. Palmer (Principal Investigator), Marie-Ève Melanson, Dilmurat Mahmut, and Abdulmuqtudad Udun (Research Assistants). This survey is significant as it is the very first survey that focuses on the Uyghurs in Canada.

Methodological Approach

The aim of this survey was to gather information on Uyghurs who left their Homeland, East Turkestan,³ and relocated to Canada. More specifically, our aim was to understand why these Uyghurs left

² For further information on the project please visit the following site: Spiritual Childhoods – Children in Minority Religions, http://www.spiritualchildhoods.ca
³ In this study we prefer to use the terms “Uyghur region,” “Uyghur Homeland,” or “East Turkestan,” to designate the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China. The Chinese term “Xinjiang” means “New Frontier,” “New Borderland,” or “New Territory,” a designation which was given to the region by the Qing dynasty in 1884, so it is politically fraught for Uyghurs because it justifies the displacement of its occupants by Chinese settlers. The term “East Turkestan” is preferred among Uyghurs, but for the Chinese government this term implies strong nationalistic
China, and how they are attempting to preserve their culture and collective identity in Canada. The 45 questions\(^4\) were made available to the target group on the Google Forms platform in both English and Uyghur,\(^5\) and the survey was distributed primarily through WhatsApp groups established by Uyghurs living in Canada. This method of distribution was chosen for several reasons, 1) it allowed the participants to use platforms that were not developed or monitored by the Chinese government (an element of great importance because many participants feared that they or their family members would become targets of further persecution by their government), 2) the platforms allowed for easy access to the survey, and 3) the platforms were familiar to our target audience. Our aim and scope are simply to communicate the results of our survey with a brief analysis of the data collected. Thus, we do not intend to offer any review of the literature about Uyghur migration to other countries, nor do we attempt to distinguish between the different Uyghur communities living within Canada.

**Responses to the Questionnaire**

106 Uyghurs from six different provinces in Canada responded to the questionnaire (see Figure 1). It is important to note that the number of first-generation adult Uyghur immigrants in Canada is estimated at around 2000, which means that our 106 respondents may be regarded as a small sample of first-generation Uyghurs in Canada. According to Statistics Canada, in 2016 only 1555 people in Canada self-identified as Uyghur.\(^6\) However, others have claimed that the Uyghur population in Canada had already reached 5000 by 2012.\(^7\) Estimates in early 2019 claimed there were around 3000 Uyghurs in Canada, with about 500 of them living in the city of Montreal.\(^8\) As our data indicates, the Uyghur population in Canada has certainly increased after 2016; 21 out of 106 respondents indicated that they had arrived in Canada after 2016. However, our survey also shows that very few Uyghurs (only six) came to Canada directly from the Uyghur region in China after 2016, most probably due to the tightened restrictions on international travel for Uyghurs introduced in 2016 and 2017.\(^9\)

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sentiments and even terrorist inclinations. Thus, to avoid siding with the Peoples Republic of China’s genocidal campaign against the Uyghurs, we have chosen to use the traditional terms of East Turkestan, and Uyghur “Homeland” or “region.”

4. We formulated the survey questions after gathering background information on the Uyghurs and after having conducted interviews with various Uyghurs in Canada. In addition, we consulted experts on religious minorities in China: Adrian Zenz, Fenggang Yang, and J. Gordon Melton. We also relied on the experience and knowledge of our two Uyghur co-authors, who are landed immigrants in Canada, to develop questions that address some of the key challenges faced by the Uyghur diaspora.

5. The Uyghur language translations were done by Dilmurat Mahmut and Abdulmuqtedir Udun.


As noted above, many of our respondents expressed concern about the possible consequences of participating in our research, as their participation might affect the personal security of their relatives living in China. They insisted that they remain anonymous. Since this survey contains sensitive questions, we took steps to safeguard the anonymity and confidentiality of our respondents. We avoided questions about individuals’ ages, professions, their hometowns in China, and which Canadian cities they now reside in, making it impossible to identify the participants in the study.

### The Political Background

The Uyghurs (also spelled “Uighurs”) are the Turkic Muslim population of China’s Xinjiang province. Their plight began receiving international mass media coverage with the student protest in the city of Urumqi in 2009, and in 2017 it became known that the Chinese government was building internment or “re-education” camps to detain Uyghurs and members of other Muslim minorities (a practice that had actually begun as early as 2014). Yet, it was only in 2018 that the scale of the discriminatory tactics of the Chinese government were made public thanks to aerial photographs of these camps taken by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. These camps have been described as “prison-like compounds [with] surrounding walls, security fences […] barbwire, reinforced security doors and windows, surveillance systems, secure access systems, watchtowers [and so on].”

The first testimonies from former detainees of these “re-education” camps became available in 2018, and were cited by major newspapers, government reports and human rights organizations. The survivors of these camps reported abusive treatment involving torture, systematic rape, electric

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shocks, unsanitary conditions, starvation, and fatalities among their fellow prisoners. Meanwhile, journalists and researchers have found compelling evidence of mass forced sterilization and forced abortion among Uyghur women both inside and outside of the re-education camps.

The Results of the Survey

Of the 106 respondents, 55 were male and 51 were female. In terms of age, 43 respondents fell within the age range of 40 to 49, representing the biggest age group (41%). The participants aged between 30 and 39 were 28 (26%), those between 18 and 29 were 18 (17%), while 17 were in the age group of 50 to 59, comprising 16% of our sample.

In terms of their geographical distribution in Canada, we found the largest group (43 respondents) were living in Quebec, followed by British Columbia (26 respondents) and then Ontario (23 respondents). Only seven (7) respondents were found in Alberta, four (4) in Saskatchewan, and one (1) in Prince Edward Island. Only one participant did not disclose their location.

The data suggests that Uyghur immigration to Canada reached its peak between 2004 and 2006, since the majority of our respondents (34 respondents) arrived in Canada during this period. The earliest arrival in Canada was in 1998. Following 1998, at least one participant arrived in Canada in each subsequent year. 64 respondents flew directly to Canada from China, while 42 had stayed in at least one other country before coming to Canada. Even in 2017, the year the Chinese authorities imposed heavy restrictions on international travel for Uyghurs, 17 respondents left China to emigrate to Canada. Only six of these 17 emigrants traveled directly to Canada from the Uyghur region. The majority arrived indirectly, from Turkey, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, and a number of other countries.

In response to the questions on immigration status, 51 were deemed skilled immigrants upon arriving in Canada, 21 were asylum seekers, 13 were international students, 13 were family reunion immigrants, two (2) were children of immigrant couples, four (4) arrived on visitor (tourist) visa, and one (1) arrived on a work visa. Only one (1) said they landed in Canada with permanent resident status (although we believe this information may be an error, as new immigrants can only have the permanent resident status after landing). At the time of our survey, 74 of our respondents had already become Canadian citizens.

In response to the question: “Why did you decide to immigrate from the Uyghur Homeland?” most of our participants indicated for political reasons (see Figure 2). This question offered eight multiple choice options and allowed respondents to add their own comments. The comment box was most often used by participants to express their desire for more freedom and less discrimination.

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Figure 2. Reasons for Emigration from the Uyghur Homeland

When asked the question of why they chose Canada specifically, 20 respondents cited reasons that echoed their reasons for emigrating from the Uyghur Homeland. However, 16 respondents indicated that they chose Canada because of its “healthcare system.” Nine (9) chose “to join family/friends,” and eight (8) pointed to “subsidies for families” as their main reasons (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. Reasons for choosing Canada as a host country

In response to the question, “Did you face discrimination in your Homeland?” 93 respondents indicated that they had faced, as ethnic Uyghurs, some form of discrimination while living in the Homeland. Whereas to the more specific question, “Were you questioned/arrested/detained for political reasons in your Homeland?” 38 answered “Yes,” and 68 answered “No.”

Regarding contact with family members left behind, which has been problematic since the 2016 intensification of the “Strike Hard” campaign in the Uyghur Homeland, 17 respondents said they had been

16. This option was not offered in the survey. It was added manually by two participants, in the space reserved to indicate “other reasons.”
17. The Communist Party of China (CPC) has periodically launched “strike hard” campaigns against the Uyghurs since 1996. These campaigns have been used as a frighteningly effective means of restricting Uyghur political, cultural, and religious expression, and have increased in intensity since 9/11, when the CPC, emboldened by “international concern about global terrorism,” felt it could increase its repression of the Uyghurs without fear of Western intervention. After Chen Quanguo became the Communist Party Secretary of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in 2016, the strike hard campaign that was initiated in 2014 intensified, eventually morphing into a campaign of active (and ongoing) genocide. See Gardner Bovingdon, The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 131–132, and Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy in cooperation with the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights, The Uyghur Genocide. For further discussion see also: Marie Trédaniel and Pak K. Lee, “Explaining the Chinese Framing of the “Terrorist” Violence in Xinjiang: Insights from Securitization Theory,” Nationalities 46, no.1 (2018): 177–195, https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2017.1351427; Sean R. Roberts,
able to maintain direct contact with only a few close relatives, 36 respondents said they had lost contact with all their relatives, 18 respondents said they communicated with some relatives once or twice a year, and 14 respondents said they were able to communicate indirectly (through friends, neighbours, or distant relatives) with close family members. Only one participant did not answer this question. Important to note is that these communications between emigrated Uyghurs and their relatives still living inside China all took place on WeChat. This is the only medium that the Chinese government allows the Uyghurs to have access to. As for the time frame, 46 participants indicated that their last contact with relatives was in 2020 (the same year we conducted this survey); 33 respondents (nearly one third) claimed they had lost contact with all their relatives in 2017; and 11 respondents claimed that their last contact was in 2018.

In response to the question, “Do you intend to encourage your child/children to marry within the Uyghur community?” received a strong response with 68 participants indicating “Yes.” In contrast, 15 said they would neither encourage nor discourage participation in such activities, whereas only two (2) respondents indicated that they would discourage their children from becoming politically active.

In response to the question, “Do you have relatives detained in the ‘re-education’ camps?” 28 participants responded “Yes,” 58 participants responded, “I am not sure,” and 19 participants indicated that they had no detained relatives. There is a correlation between the high number (58) of respondents who were unsure whether their relatives were detained or not and the fact that 46 respondents (almost half) had lost contact with their relatives in their Homeland after 2017.

In response to the question, “What language do you speak most often with your family at home?” the majority (67 out of 78 who responded to this question) said it was their native Uyghur language. Another eight (8) indicated the language most spoken at home was English. Only one respondent spoke French at home, and another named Japanese. In addition, one respondent spoke both Uyghur and English at home. None of our participants indicated that they used the Chinese language, Mandarin, at home. In their Homeland most Uyghurs do not speak Mandarin with their families, so our data suggests the situation has not changed since they arrived in Canada. On the other hand, there has been a conscious effort to preserve their language and culture to transmit to the children they are raising in Canada. To this end, Uyghur parents have been establishing Uyghur language schools in various cities in Canada.

In response to the question, “Do you send your child/children to a Uyghur language school?” 53 (out of a total of 77 parents) responded “Yes.” However, this question did not allow for those with no children, or those with children under school age (babies and toddlers) the opportunity to respond, so this result was misleading regarding the parents’ intentions. Uyghur language schools are proliferating in many major Canadian cities of Quebec, Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia, where there are great numbers of Uyghurs. Since the Covid-19 pandemic broke out in early 2020, more Uyghurs parents seem to have enrolled their children in Uyghur language schools, since the lessons could be taught online.

The question, “Do you intend to encourage your child/children to marry within the Uyghur community?” received a strong response with 68 participants indicating “Yes,” while only eight (8) participants remained neutral on this issue. Only two (2) participants responded “No” to this question. In respect to the question as to whether they encourage their children to participate in Uyghur political protests, public demonstrations, or online Uyghur activist projects, more than three-quarters (61) of respondents said “Yes.” In contrast, 15 said they would neither encourage nor discourage participation in such activities, whereas only two (2) respondents indicated that they would discourage their children from becoming politically active.

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19. Co-author Dilmurat Mahmut’s wife who is a Uyghur language teacher has shared this information with us.
The questionnaire also allowed us to collect data on marital status. Out of those respondents (82) who were married at the time of our survey, almost all of them (76) said their spouses were Uyghur. While 75 participants said their partners were living with them in Canada, seven (7) participants said their spouses were living abroad.

In response to the question, “Is Islam an important part of Uyghur collective identity?” 99 out of 106 respondents said “Yes.” Of the 99 participants who responded “Yes,” 49 said that Islam was “one of the many important aspects” of Uyghur identity, while 38 participants regarded Islam as “the most important aspect” of Uyghur identity. Only 12 participants indicated that there were other, more important aspects to Uyghur identity. It should be noted that these Uyghurs were heavily restricted while in China and could not freely practice Islam. They would be punished for reciting or owning the Qur’an, for praying, and for wearing headscarves.

Out of 106 participants, 99 identified Islam as their religion. Three (3) participants said they had “no religion,” while two (2) participants simply stated that they were “believers.” Two respondents skipped this question. Almost half (48 of 99) claimed that they had become more religious after immigrating to Canada. In contrast, 43 out of 99 respondents suggested that settling in Canada did not have any impact on their level of religiosity, i.e., that they were “always as religious as today.” Only seven (7) said they had become “less religious” since arriving in Canada. One respondent who identified “Islam” as their religion failed to specify whether their level of religiosity had increased, decreased, or remained stable. Figure 4 represents the way religiosity practice has increased, decreased or remained stable among Uyghurs since they arrived in Canada.

![Figure 4. Level of Religiosity since Arriving in Canada](image-url)
Comments and Analysis

This survey addresses the question: “Who are the Uyghurs in Canada?” It explores the reasons Uyghurs left China and settled in Canada, while focusing on the challenges related to maintaining their Uyghur identity and transmitting it to their children. Our findings confirm that the main reason for emigration is oppression: the majority of our participants reported experiencing discrimination as ethnic Uyghurs while living in their Homeland. They relocated to the West to “avoid discrimination,” to “escape arrest and detention,” or to “escape police harassment.” Their responses indicate that they came to Canada to seek more freedom, higher education and better job opportunities for themselves and their children.

Our data shows a strong desire among Uyghur expatriates to preserve Uyghur language, culture, and values in the diaspora. They are practically pursuing this goal through endogamous marriages, devotion to Islam, and educating their children in their mother tongue. In a different study, we also observed a strong trend among Uyghurs to place a stronger emphasis on their Uyghur Muslim heritage since arriving in Canada.

Since Xi Jinping’s rise to power in 2012, the repression of Islam and Uyghur cultural traditions has accelerated, making it difficult, perhaps impossible, for Uyghurs to transmit the distinctive traits of their religious and cultural identity to the next generation. Chinese authorities claim that the Uyghur population in Xinjiang has increased from 5.5 million to 12.8 million over the past 40 years, but researchers have found that the birthrate of Uyghurs has been in sharp decline over the last five years. Given this context, it is not surprising that our data shows, as just noted, that there is a strong concern among Uyghurs in Canada to preserve their collective identity and culture and to transmit their language to their children.

We hope that the data collected will be useful to other researchers studying the Uyghur community both in Canada and in other diaspora communities. We have noted determination amongst our research subjects to speak up and to raise public awareness about the plight of the Uyghurs in East Turkestan where the cultural identity of the Uyghur population has been systematically eroded, their land appropriated, and their population culled by the assimilationist and oppressive policies of the Chinese government. This situation has recently (since 2020) been recognized by seven nations: the U.S., Canada, the Netherlands, and

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21. For more information, see Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s remarks on Xinjiang-related issues at the following link: [http://ca.china-embassy.org/eng/zjwl/t1863554.htm](http://ca.china-embassy.org/eng/zjwl/t1863554.htm).
22. Experts claim that China has detained over a million Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang, and that the Beijing central government, in tandem with Xinjiang’s provincial government, is pursuing an aggressive campaign to reduce and assimilate the minority Muslim population. Researcher Adrian Zenz argues that China’s birth-control policies could increase the Han population in southern Xinjiang – where the Uyghur population is concentrated – from its current level of 8.4% to about 25% by 2040. According to official Chinese statistics, there was a 48.7% decline in birth rates in ethnic minority areas of Xinjiang between 2017 and 2019. See Cate Cadell, “Exclusive China Policies Could Cut Millions of Uyghur Births in Xinjiang,” *Reuters*, June 6, 2021, [https://www.reuters.com/world/china/exclusive-amid-accusations-genocide-west-china-policies-could-cut-millions-uyghur-2021-06-07/](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/exclusive-amid-accusations-genocide-west-china-policies-could-cut-millions-uyghur-2021-06-07/). Between 2015 and 2018, combined natural population growth rates in the four prefectures of southern Xinjiang (Hotan, Kashgar, Aksu, Kizilsu), where most Uyghurs live, declined by 72.9%. Meanwhile, the Chinese government aims to increase the Han settler population in the region through large financial incentives, see Adrien Zenz, “‘End the Dominance of the Uyghur Ethnic Group’: An Analysis of Beijing’s Population Optimization Strategy in Southern Xinjiang,” *Central Asian Survey*, 40, no. 3 (2021): 291–312, [https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2021.1946483](https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2021.1946483).
Lithuania, Belgium, the Czech Republic, the U.K., and France as a “genocide.” It will be interesting to compare our results to those of future surveys of Uyghurs in the diaspora in other countries.

Bibliography


